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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff-appellee, Bonneville 
Properties, Inc. ("Bonneville"), for breach of contract and 
unjust enrichment against defendant-appellant, Dan Simons 
("Simons"), over the amount of a real estate conunission 
allegedly earned by virtue of a unilateral contract of sub-
agency. 
DISPOSITTON OF THE LOWER COURT 
Judgment was entered on December 22, 1981, by the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Judge, in favor of 
Bonneville and against Simons in the sum of $11,000.00, to-
gether with prejudgment interest in the sum of $3,703.23, 
calculated at the rate of six percent per annum, and costs of 
$222.60, following a trial to the court. The judgment was 
based upon an of fer of a unilateral contract of subagency 
arising through the advertisement by Simons, a listing agent, 
of his listing agreement with the Salt Lake Board of Realtors 
Multiple Listing Service. (Findings of Fact numbers 6 through 
8). The trial court held, inter alia, that Simons could not 
revoke or change the of fer of subagency after Bonneville 
initiated action on the unilateral offer, without regard for 
whether a ready, willing and able purchaser on the terms 
specified in the offer had actually been produced. (Findings 
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of Fact numbers 5, 15, 20 through 23; Conclusions of Law 
number 5). 
RELIEF. SOUGHT ON APP.EAL 
Simons respectfully requests this court to reverse 
the lower court,. s judgment for the reasons that Cl) it is un-
supported by the facts, and (2). it is incorrect as a matter 
of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The basic facts, most of which were stipulated by 
the parties, are as follows: 
Essentially, this appeal involves a listing agree-
ment of Simons' published by the Salt Lake Board of Realtors 
Multiple Listing Service concerning a warehouse located at 
2350 South 2300 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, known as Fashion 
Fabrics. On January 2, 1975, Simons changed his commission 
split, reducing the share of the commission payable to the 
selling broker from 60 percent to 40 percent. 
published and effective on January 10, 1975. 
The change was 
The property 
was sold pursuant to contingent documents dated February 3, 
1975, which closed at some point between March 15 and April 
15, 1975, and Bonneville was paid 40 percent of the commission 
as per the published conunission split in effect at that;. date. 
(Tr. 3-4, Ex. 6). 
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Bonneville is a Utah corporation. L. Richard 
Sorensen (nsorensen'') is the controlling shareholder and 
chief executive officer of Bonneville, is a licensed real 
estate broker and does business as "Bonneville Properties." 
At the times material to this action Dennis Christensen 
("Christensen") worked with Bonneville as a licensed real 
estate agent. By the terms of his agreement, any commissions 
due Sorensen or Bonneville on sales generated by Christensen 
would be divided fifty-fifty between them after deducting ten 
percent for expenses. (Tr. 5). 
Simons is a licensed real estate broker doing busi-
ness at the material time as Real Estate Consultants. Simons 
has been a licensed real estate agent since 1959 and a 
licensed real estate broker since 1968. He has extensive 
I 
experience in the highly specialized commercial and industrial 
aspect of the real estate business and has served 1 his pro-
fession in numerous capacities, having been for example, 
Regional Vice President of the National Association of Realtors, 
Rocky Mountain Region, 1981-82; President of Utah Association 
of Realtors, 1979-80; and President of Salt Lake Board of 
Realtors, 1974-75. (Tr. 5-6). 
On or about September 25, 1974, Simons entered into 
an exclusive listing agreement with Fashion Fab~±.cs, lnc. for 
the sale of the Fashion Fabrics Warehouse located at 2350 
South 2300 West, Salt Lake City, Utah. (.Tr. 6) (~x. 3). 
-3-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Simons advertised the property for sale through the 
Salt Lake Board of Realtors Multiple Listing Service. (Ex. 1). 
The Multiple Listing Service, for purposes of this suit, was 
an arrangement whereby member brokers extended an open, uni-
lateral offer of subagency, for a stipulated commission split, 
to other member brokers with respect to properties listed with 
the offering broker. Otherwise, the tenns of the offer were 
at least in part defined by the rules of the Multiple Listing 
Service. Simons and Sorensen were both members of the 
Multiple Listing Service. (Tr. 6). 
When the Fashion Fabrics property was first adver-
tised through the Multiple Listing Service, Simons' published 
commission split with the Salt Lake Board of Realtors was 
sixty percent to the selling broker and forty percent to the 
listing broker. ·on or about January 2, 1975, Simons wrote a 
letter to the Salt Lake Board of Realtors changing his com~ 
mission split to sixty percent to the listing broker and 
forty percent to the selling broker. This notice of change 
of commission split was effective on January 10, 1975, when 
it was published in the January 10, 1975, Multiple Listing 
Service book. (Tr. 6-7). 
The rules of the Salt Lake Board of Realtors 
Multiple Listing Service in effect at the material time, 
which at least in part constituted terms of any unilateral 
contract reached, stipulated that a commission split must 
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remain in effect for at least twenty days but could be 
changed thereafter at any time by giving written notice to 
the Board, effective when published in the next Multiple 
Listing Service book. When Simons changed,his conunission 
split, no written offer had been submitted or reached by the 
eventual purchaser of the Fashion Fabrics warehouse which was 
an essential ingredient of the eventual sale. (Finding of 
Fact number 16; Tr. 7-8). 
In mid-1974, the Adnan and Essam Kash~9gi families 
became interested in developing what is now the Salt Lake 
International Center. In August, 1974, the Kashoggi families 
formed a Utah corporation known as A. K. Utah Properties, 
Inc., d/b/a the Salt Lake International Center, for the pur-
pose of acquiring the property upon which the center was to 
be located and proceeding with the development. (Tr. 8-9). 
Prior to the formation of A. K. Utah Properties, 
Inc. most of the International Center property was owned by 
Jelco, Inc., a Utah corporation, but a part of one section 
necessary for the development was owned by the Robert B. 
Swaner Company (''Swaner") • Shortly after its formation in 
August, 1974, A. K. Utah acquired the majority of Jelco's 
interest in the International Center property, CTr. 9) leav-
ing the Swaner property as the remaining essential acquisition. 
On or about September 25, 1974, A. K. Utah entered 
into an exchange agreement with Swaner whereby it was agreed 
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that Swaner would convey its interest in the International 
Center property to A. K. Utah, Swaner would locate other prop-
erty satisfactory to it, and A. K" Utah would purchase that 
property and make a tax free exchange of such property for 
Swaner's interest in the International Center property. 
A. K. Utah's exchange agreement with the Swaner 
company was eventually performed as modified at some time be-
tween mid-March and mid-April, 1975, pursuant to contingent 
documents dated February 3, 1975, by A. K. Utah's purchase of 
Fashion Fabric's interest in a building located at 2350 South 
2300 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the contemporaneous ex-
change of that interest for Swaner's interest in the Inter-
national Center property. Neither A. K. Utah nor Jelco, Inc. 
was ever at any time interested in purchasing the Fashion 
Fabrics property for its own account. A. K. Utah's only in-
terest in the property was the possible satisfaction of its 
exchange agreement with the Robert B. Swaner Company. It is 
the consummation of that exchange transaction and the atten-
dant sale of the Fashion Fabrics warehouse out of which the 
instant controversy between Bonneville and Simons arises. 
(Tr. 9-10). 
In early December, 1974, Bonneville's agent met 
with a representative of Jelco, Inc. with regard to the possi-
bility that the Fashion Fabrics prope~ty might be used to per-
form the Swaner exchange agreement. (Tr. 91. 
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The Executive Vice-President of A. K. Utah, Mr. 
Emanual A. Floor, testified that he was in charge of and had 
"all the authority" with respect to the Fashion Fabrics-
Swaner arrangement. Mr, Floor further testified that Jelco, 
Inc. had no authority to represent A. K. Utah and that neither 
Bonneville, Sorensen or Christensen were ever retained to repre-
sent A. K. Utah on the transaction. (Tr. 231-233) Mr. 
Floor's testimony is uncontroverted. 
It is clear and uncontroverted, therefore, that 
Bonneville represented no one in the transaction. It is also 
clear that Bonneville did nothing in the negotiations leading 
up to the sale. Bonneville's claim is based upon the sole 
fact that it introduced the idea for the Fashion Fabrics trans-
action to Simons. The trial court so concluded at Finding of 
Fact paragraph 11 and Conclusion of Law number 5. 
The uncontroverted testimony of Mr. Floor was that 
prior to January 27, 1975, Jelco, Inc., or its representative, 
was demanding payment to it of a "special fee" of $100,000.00, 
which was not acceptable to either party to the transaction. 
The trial court concluded at Conclusion of Law number 25 that 
it was only after that requirement had been dropped that there 
was any final agreement acceptable to either A. K. Utah (Tr. 
237-239, 241), or Fashion Fabrics (Tr, 149-52). 
Upon sale of the Fashion Fabrics warehou.se a payment 
became due Simons and other brokers by the seller, Fashion 
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Fabrics, in the a9gregate amount of $125,000.00. Of this sum, 
$25,000.00 was owed and paid to Slmons' referring broker, Jim 
Shaunessey, and is not at issue in this lawsuit, leaving 
$100,000.00 due Simons and any other broker entitled to share 
in the commission. Simon's commission split with other brokers 
as published through the Salt Lake Board of Realtors at the 
time contingent documents were executed, February 3, 1975, was 
sixty percent to the listing broker and forty percent to the 
selling broker. (Tr. 10-11) 
It was agreed by stipulation that Simons in fact be-
lieved that he was entitled to sixty percent, or $60,000.00, 
and Simons agreed that Sorensen should receive forty percent, 
or $40,000.00, in accordance with the published commission 
split as of that date. Fashion Fabrics could not afford to pay 
the commission in a lump sum. Simons, therefore, in order to 
allow the sale to close and in an effort to help Fashion 
Fabrics with its cash flow problems, agreed to accept payment 
of the commission in installments. Simons also agreed to a 
separate agreement between Fashion Fabrics and Bonneville 
whereby Bonneville got its share of the commission before 
Simons got his because Christensen was in financial trouble. 
Bonneville was paid $40,000.00 in cash. Bonneville paid 
Christensen $18,000.00. In July, 1975, Fashion Fabrics had 
run out of money and Simons agreed to and did accept restricted 
stock in Fashion Fabrics in satisfaction of the remaining 
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$22,000.00 due him. Fashion Fabrics subsequently went out of 
business and Simons' stock is valueless. (~r. 11) 
It is important to note that there was no agreement, 
oral or written, between Bonneville, Sorensen or Christensen 
and Simons with respect to any commission on the Fashion Fabrics 
listing, apart from any agreement which might be implied or in 
fact exist by virtue of the respective brokers' membership in 
the Salt Lake Board of Realtors, Simons' offer of subagency 
through the Multiple Listing Service, and custom and usage in 
the trade. (Tr. 12) 
Mr. B. L. Scott, Executive Secretary of the Salt Lake 
Board of Realtors, testified by way of stipulation, and identi-
fied the Rules and Regulations governing operation of the 
Multiple Listing Service. (Ex. 2) Mr. Scott's stipulated 
testimony was that at the relevant time, when called upon to 
arbitrate disputes between brokers regarding commission splits, 
that the split in effect as of the date of a written and bind-
ing offer, if such offer did not vary from the terms of the 
listing, was determinative. (Tr. 18-19) It is uncontro-
verted that no written, binding offer was ever submitted until 
the transaction actually closed on or about March 27, 1975, 
almost three months after Simons changed his commission split. 
On or about June 3, 1976, Dennis Christensen filed 
suit against Dan Simons in the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah, Civil No. C 76-174, seeking damages 
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for alleged violations of the antitrust laws of the United 
States, alleging a conspiracy to deprive Christensen of his 
fair share of the real estate conunission attributable to the 
sale of the Fashion Fabrics property by virtue of Simons' 
change in commission split, and a pendent claim for breach of 
contract concerning the commission, all of which arose out of 
the same transaction or occurrence which is the subject of the 
instant action. Simons and Christensen settled that lawsuit 
pursuant to an agreement, a copy of which was attached to 
Simons' trial brief as Exhibit ''A'', and Christensen executed a 
general release of all claims in favor of Simons, a copy of 
which was attached to Simons' trial brief as Exhibit "B". 
Under the terms of Sorensen's agreement with Christensen in 
effect when-the Fashion Fabrics warehouse was sold, Sorensen 
would have been obligated to pay Christensen, after deducting 
ten percent for expenses, fifty percent of any commission due 
Sorensen on the sale. (Tr. 13-14) 
ARGUMENT 
l?OINT I 
FUNDAMENTAL UTAH LAW CONCERNING 
UNILATERAL CONTRACTS OF SUBAGENCY 
BETWEEN REAL ESTATE BROKERS IS IGNORED 
Utah law is clear that a unilateral offer of subagency 
between real estate brokers may be withdrawn at any time before 
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it is accepted by producing a written, binding offer from a 
ready, willing and able purchaser, on the terms specified in 
the offer. E.g., Boyer· Co. v. Lignell, 567 P. 2d 1112 (Utah 
1977). The trial court misconceived the law in that regard 
and applied, instead, the minority rule of some other juris-
dictions in general contract cases that substantial performance 
gives rise to an implied promise not to revoke the original 
offer. See, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, Section 45, Conunent g. 
The minority rule of the Restatement has never been 
adopted in Utah. Even if it were, the facts supporting it are 
not present in this case. The issue of law here, therefore, 
is whether the well settled Utah law governing brokerage com-
missions is to be abandoned in favor of a modified version of 
the minority position. 
A. A Broker's Unilateral Offer Of Subagency May Be Withdrawn 
Before It Is Accepted by Performance. 
In essence, Bonneville claims that its agent, 
Christensen, introduced Simons to the party which purchased 
the Fashion Fabrics warehouse (Finding of Fact No. 11, Con-
clusion of Law No. 5); and that the "introduction of the 
purchaser's name was significant" (Conclusion of Law No. 5) 
to the transaction contemplated by Simons" open, unilateral 
offer of subagency. The necessary conclusion, though unarticu-
lated in the Findings and Conclusions, is that the mere act 
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of introduction rendered Simons' offer irrevocable and not sub-
ject to modification. Such a conclusion is not supported by 
either the facts or the law. 
There was no oral or written agreement between 
Bonneville and Simons apart from any agreement implied by virtue 
of their respective membership in the Salt Lake Board of 
Realtors, the rules of the multiple listing service, and custom 
and usage in the trade. The uncontroverted testimony was that, 
under those rules, Simons was entitled to change his commission 
split (that is, to modify his offer of subagency) effective upon 
publication in the next multiple listing service book, at any 
time prior to the delivery of a written, binding offer meeting 
all terms and conditions of the listing agreement or at any 
time prior to the execution by buyer and seller of a written, 
binding agreement to other terms. (Findings of Fact No. 27, 
stipulated testimony of B. L. "Nick" Scott, Executive Secretary, 
Salt Lake Board of Realtors). See, Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 
P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977). Here, Simons' modification was given 
January 2, 1975, (Finding of Fact No. 15) and effective 
January 10, 1975. The trial court found it to be a fact, con-
clusive against the position of Bonneville under existing 
Utah law, that on the effective date of modification, January 
10, 1975, there was no written, binding agreement among the 
parties to the exchange transaction which was eventually 
consummated on March 27, 1975. (Finding of Fact No. 16). 
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Sorensen himself admitted that he had been informed by the 
Board of Realtors that there was no point in fili~g a complaint 
with the Board because Simons' change in his conunission split 
was proper and Sorensen would lose, (Tr. 98-101). 
Prior to ·a·ctual pe:rforman·ce, it is of no consequence 
that Bonneville made efforts to perform, which the trial court 
considered "significant. " As the Utah Court said in· E. B. 
Wicks Co. v. Moyle, 103 Utah 554, 137 P.2d 342 C.1943): 
A broker is never entitled to conunissions 
for unsuccessful efforts. The risk of a fail-
ure is wholly his. The reward comes only with 
his success. That is the plain contract and 
contemplation of the parties. The broker may 
devote his time and labor, and expend his 
money with ever so much devotion to the in-
terests of his employer, and yet if he fails, 
if without effecting an agreement for accomp-
lishing a bargain, he abandons the effort, or 
his authority is fairly and in good faith term-
inated, he gains no right to conunissions. 
Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N.Y. 378, 
33 Am Rep. 441. 
Performance which will constitute acceptance of the 
offer of subagency must either be a binding offer embodying all 
of the terms specified in the listing agreement, or constitute 
buyer and seller's written, binding agreement to other terms. 
Boyer, supra. Finding a buyer satisfying· most of the terms, 
or on terms substantially the same, qr even finding a buyer who 
agrees to the same te.rms at a later date, clearly is not 
sufficient. E. B. Wicks Co., supra~ The correct statement of 
the proposition on the facts of this case, is at RESTATEMENT 
2d., AGENCY§ 447: 
-13-
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An agent whose compensation is conditioned 
upon his procuring a transaction on specified 
terms is not entitled to such compensation if, 
as a result of his efforts a transaction is 
effected on different or modified terms, al-
though the principal thereby benefits. 
The Utah Court adopted this proposition verbatim in 
E. B. Wicks Co., supra. The facts of the Wicks case, moreover, 
are dispositive against the position asserted by Bonneville 
here for in Wicks the broker was held not entitled to a com-
mission even though an agreement was reached with his client 
at a later date. Approp:os· the facts herein, where a commission 
or "bribe" to Jelco had to be eliminated before there was an 
offer acceptable to the parties (Finding of Fact No. 25) and 
Simons had to complete complex negotiations, including many 
with government authorities (Tr. 270-283 ), the Utah Court, 
with Justice Wolf concurring separately, held in Wicks that 
the mere fact that the seller (in that case a lessor) suffered 
the loss of one months' rental made the performance sufficiently 
different to preclude entitlement to a commission. 
The logic of the foregoing holdings cannot be denied. 
Simons' initial published listing was stipulated to be 60% "to 
the selling broker." (emphasis added). No offer was ever made 
for a mere "finder •. " When it became obvious that Simons would 
himself have to perform the services his offer contemplated 
(see testimony of Simons at Tr, 220-283) concerning the 
services performed and expenses incurred) it was not only fair, 
but necessary, for him to change the commission split to 
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reflect the reality of the transaction as it developed. That 
he nevertheless agreed to pay 40% to Bonneville, which had done 
nothing, was in reality an act of_ generosity, for Bonneville 
plainly was not the "selling broker." 
If it were the law that the offering agent could not 
revoke or modify an offer of subagency, even to another broker 
who had undertaken efforts to perform, the result would be 
sheer chaos. The uncontroverted testimony in this case is that 
Simons was entertaining offers from a large number of other 
brokers simultaneously with the A. K. Utah-Swaner negotiations. 
(Tr. 265-268). If Bonneville were held entitled to complete 
performance on the offer in effect prior to January 10, 1975, 
merely because it had devoted efforts prior to that date, then 
why not each of the other agents for the many other prospective 
purchasers with whom Simons and Fashion Fabrics were negotiating 
at the time? The result might mean that an offering broker 
could incur obligations to any number of performing subagents, 
possibly after the property was already sold. It would, 
moreover, be plainly unfair to prohibit brokers from changing 
their commission splits when the magnitude of time and expense 
devoted to a particular listing made it unreasonable, unecon-
omical and unfair to continue to offer a more advant~geous split 
with other brokers who had not yet produced the only thing that 
counts--that being a sale. The very operation of the real 
estate industry would be impossible if confined by such 
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rigid strictures. 
B. The Findings By The Trial Court Conclusively Deny Any 
Acceptance Of The Offer. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law establish 
that when Simons modified his offer of subagency with respect to 
the commission split by letter of January 2, 1975, effective 
January 10 ,· 1975, neither Bonneville nor anyone else had pro-
duced a written binding offer from a buyer ready, willing and 
able to purchase on the terms listed, as required by the fore-
going authorities. Indeed, there could be no "ready, willing 
and able buyer" until A. K. Utah and Swaner reached a binding 
contract for satisfaction of the Swaner exchange agreement 
(Finding of Fact No. 21), which event did not occur until the 
transaction actually closed on March 27, 1975. (Finding of 
Fact No. 28). Prior to that time, any talk about the Fashion 
Fabrics building was precisely that--just talk. 
Indeed, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered by the trial court are conclusive that there could not 
have been a valid acceptance before the commission split was 
changed. The trial court's finding that negotiations broke down 
"during a period that Jelco, Inc. made persistent demands for an 
additional commission of $100,000.00" [characterized by Stan 
Shaw as a "bribe"] (Finding of Fact No. 25) is conclusive against 
the position of Bonneville under both Utah law and the minority 
rule of the Restatement. 
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The terms on which the Fashion :Fabrics warehouse were 
sold, moreover differed significantly from those set forth in 
the listing agreement.. (Tr. 2 7 8-8 3) 
Moreover, Bonneville was not the ''selling broker" in 
any sense. The trial court determined as a fact (and, indeed, 
Bonneville did not dispute) that neither Bonneville, Sorensen 
or Christensen "represented A. K .. Utah as realtors at any time." 
(Finding of Fact No. 11). Bonneville had no client and Bonneville's 
agent did not even show the subject property to the purchaser. 
Bonneville did not represent the Robert B. Swaner Company. That 
entity was represented by Bernard Fallentine of Tracy Realty who 
first showed Swaner the Fashion Fabrics warehouse and who con-
ducted some of the negotiations concerning the proposed exchange 
on behalf of Swaner. (.Tr. 185-190 ) • Plaintiff did not repre-
sent Fashion Fabrics--Simons performed that role. 
The only thing that Bonneville did do was have an idea 
(one, it should be noted, that Fallentine had already had and 
pursued) (Tr. 130) and contact Jelco and Simons pursuant to that 
idea. (See Conclusion of Law No. 5). 
The proposal being urged by Jelco with respect to sale 
of the warehouse was, moreover, an entirely different deal than 
that eventually consummated by :Fashion Fabrics, A. K. Utah and 
Swaner because of Jelco's persistent demand of an additional 
$100, 000. 00. The transaction was never consummated until the 
parties to the transaction were clear that Jelco and its demand 
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for the extra $100,000.00 were completely out of the picture--
which also occurred long after Simons changed his commission 
split. 
c. Simons' Change In The Commission Split Was In Good Faith. 
The controlling holding of this Court in E. B. Wicks 
Co. v. Moyle, supra, does recognize that one who terminates a 
unilateral offer (in this case, an offer of subagency) must do 
so ''fairly and in good faith.'' Even on that score the facts are 
conclusive against the position of Bonneville, however, for the 
parties stipulated that ''Simons believed, therefore, that he was 
entitled to sixty percent" (Tr. 11) and the trial court deter-
mined "that the Defendant Simons in changing his commission split 
as set forth in his letter of January 2, 1975, did so, acting in 
good faith." (Emphasis added) (Finding of Fact No. 15) .. 
''THE COURT: Well, is there any dispute that he 
did that in good faith? I have no reason [to 
be.lieve] he didn't do it in good faith. " (Tr. 
224) 
Indeed, the trial court excluded all evidence offered by Simons 
going to the question of his good faith, such as the extra-
ordinary amount of time Simons had devoted to the matter, the 
$20,000.00 in expenses he had incurred, and the extent of his 
negotiations with brokers other than Bonneville, on the grounds 
that such evidence was innnaterial, there being no question that 
Simons had changed his split in good faith. (Tr. 224) 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
AMEND ITS ANSWER OR AMEND THE 
PLEADINGS TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE 
The defendant's answer to the amended complaint, dated 
December 10, 1975, was prepared and signed by Ellen M. Maycock, 
Esq., who was acting as counsel for defendant at that time. Ms. 
Maycock withdrew as counsel for defendant on March 6, 1980. At 
that point counsel herein, who had formerly ·been shown on the 
pleadings but had no active role, assumed responsibility for the 
litigation. Six days prior to trial counsel for defendant 
noticed a manifest factual error in the answer filed by de-
fendant's former ·counsel--specifically, an admission that 
Bonneville had introduced Simons to the party who purchased the 
Fashion Fabrics warehouse. The facts, never disputed by the 
parties, were that Bonneville had introduced Simons to Jelco, 
Inc. (not the purchaser) and that Jelco, Inc., in turn, had in-
troduced Simons to the eventual purchaser, A. K. Utah. 
Counsel for defendant inunediately telephoned counsel 
for plaintiff, advised him of the manifest error and asked that 
he stipulate for leave to amend. He refused. The following 
day, five days before trial, counsel for Simons prepared, filed 
and hand delivered to Bonneville's counsel a motion for leave 
to amend the answer. (See defendant's motion for leave to 
amend, dated August 26, 1981). 
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The motion was argued to the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson prior to trial, on August 31, 1981. (Tr. 28-40} 
In opposing the motion counsel for plaintiff argued in essence 
that granting the motion would prejudice plaintiff by depriving 
it of the ability to adduce evidence concerning any agency 
relationship that may have existed between A. K. Utah and Jelco. 
Specifically, plaintiff's counsel argued that when Bonneville's 
agents introduced Simons to Jelco, the Jelco employee attending 
that meeting, one Gary Jenkins, had stated that Jelco repre-
sented A. K. Utah. At the time of trial Jenkins was no longer 
with Jelco, resided in Phoenix, Arizona, and had not been deposed 
by either party. Counsel for plaintiff, therefore, claimed he 
would be prejudiced by his inability to adduce testimony con-
cerning Gary Jenkins' statement, which was plain hearsay in any 
event. 
Counsel for Simons then offered to stipulate that Mr. 
Jenkins would so testify if called, but counsel for plaintiff 
declined to accept that stipulation. Counsel for Simons also 
pointed out that A. K. Utah's executive vice president, Emanuel 
A. Floor, was under subpoena by both parties and was available 
to testify concerning what, if any, relationship existed be-
tween A. K. Utah and Jelco with respect to the Fashion Fabrics 
transaction. 
The court refused to continue the trial and denied 
leave to amend. (Tr. 37, 40) 
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At trial all evidence adduced by both parties es-
tablished the facts as recited in defendant's motion for leave 
to amend, that is, that Bonneville introduced Simons to Jelco 
and that Jelco subsequently introduced Simons to A. K. Utah. 
No evidence was offered on the question of what, if any re-
lationship existed between A. K. Utah and Jelco· be·f:o·re January 
1, 1975, but the uncontroverted evidence conclusively estab-
lished that from and after January 1, 1975, there was no agency 
relationship whatsoever between A. K. Utah and Jelco. 
At the conclusion of trial counsel for Simons moved 
the court, again, for an order amending the pleadings to con-
form to the evidence. The court denied that motion, despite 
the clear mandate of Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The court then entered Findings of Fact numbers 11 and 12: 
"11. That Plaintiff, by and through its 
agents, L. Richard Sorensen and Dennis 
Christensen, met with the Defendant Simons 
in December, 1974, at the offices of Gary 
Jenkins, and that at such meeting and at 
such time disclosed to Defendant Simons 
that A. K. Utah Properties was a prospective 
purchaser of the Fashion Fabrics Warehouse, 
but that neither Plaintiff nor its agents, 
L. Richard Sorensen and Dennis Christensen, 
represented A. K. Utah as realtors at any 
time." · 
12. That the Plaintiff's agent, as ad-
mitted in the Defendant's pleadings, intro-
duced to the Defendant the party who purch-
ased the Fashion Fabrics Warehouse, and the 
Plaintiff, through its agent or agents, in-
troduced to the Defendant the name of A. K. 
Utah as a prospective purchaser, such intro-
duction occurring at a meeting in the off ices 
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of Jelco, Inc. Plaintiff never personally 
introduced A. K. Utah to Defendant." 
The finding that plaintiff introduced defendant Simons 
to the party who purchased· the warehouse is not supported by an 
iota of evidence. It is, rather, based solely on the erroneous 
admission set forth in paragraph 6 of defendant's answer. 
Moreover, the court's other findings with respect to Bonneville's 
relationship to the transaction are completely inconsistent with 
the conclusion that Bonneville introduced Simons to the purch-
asers. The court found that "neither Plaintiff nor its agents, 
L. Richard Sorensen and Dennis Christensen, represented A. K. 
Utah as realtors at any time'' (Findings of Fact No. 11) and 
that plaintiff never personally introduced defendant to A. K. 
Utah and that all plaintiff did was introduce Simons ''to the 
name of A. K. Utah as a prospective purchaser." (Findings of 
Fact No. 12) (emphasis added). It is patently inconsistent with 
interests of justice and grossly unfair to bind the defendant 
Simons to a manifest error concerning a fact which was never in 
dispute and which was contained in ~ pleading he did not prepare 
and did not sign. 
Utah law, and indeed, the law in every jurisdiction, 
is that failure to permit leave to amend to correct such a man-
ifest error, or to conform to the evidence, is an abuse of dis-
cretion. Rule 15(a], Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, so provides. 
Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d. 165, 486 P.2d 1045 (1971}; cf. ~hy 
v. Ganey, 23 Utah 633, 66 Pac. 190 (1901}. See, also, First 
_.,.,_ 
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Security Bank of Utah v. Co·lonial Ford, Inc., 597 P.2d 859 
(Utah 19791. 
POINT III 
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED TO 
CORRECT MANIFEST ERRORS OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 
The trial court committed numerous other errors re-
quiring reversal, as follows: 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Was Lacking. 
At the commencement of trial counsel moved to dismiss 
for the reason that Bonneville lacked statutory authority to 
maintain this action. In that regard, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 61-2-18 provides: 
No person, partnership, association or 
corporation shall bring or maintain an action 
in any court of this state for the recovery 
of commission, a fee, or compensation for any 
act done or service rendered • • • unless such 
person is duly licensed hereunder as a real 
estate broker •••• 
The evidence is clear and uncontroverted that Bonneville 
is not so licensed. Mr. Steven Francis, the director of the 
Real Estate Division of the State of Utah, so indicated by 
affidavit (Tr. 40) and further testified to that effect. (Tr. 
209) This Court has given literal effect to the prohibitions of 
the statute. Diversified General Corporation v. White Barn Golf 
Course, I'nc., 584 P.2d 848 (Utah 19781; Chas·e v. Mo·rg·an, 339 P.2d 
1018 (Utah 1959); Young v. Buchanan, 259 P. 2d 976 (Utah 1953). 
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B. Denial Of Prof·erred P'roo·f On Custom And. us·ag·e· Was An Abuse 
Of Discretion. 
It was stipulated between the parties that Bonneville's 
claim that a contract for sixty percent of the commission ex-
isted could derive only from "the parties' membership in the 
multiple listing service, the rules thereof, and custom and usage 
in the trade." (Tr. 12) Yet, when Simons proferred proof of 
the trade's custom and usage to rebut Bonneville's claim of 
contract, it was excluded by the trial court. (Tr. 283-291) 
In so doing the trial court abused its discretion and committed 
reversible error. 
C. Award Of Pre-Judgment Interest wa·s E:rror. 
Damages awarded by the trial court included pre-judgment 
interest in the sum of $3,703.23. We know of no authority for 
such an award. 
D. Any Claim Of Bonneville Has Been Waived. 
It is clear on the stipulated facts that any claim of 
Bonneville is necessarily based upon its agent, ChFistensen, 
suggesting an "idea" to Simons. Yet, Christensen brought suit 
on that very claim in the federal courts and compromised his 
claim with Simons. (Tr. 13) It is familiar that the related 
rules of res judicata, collateral estoppel, waiver and release 
are for the "purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of 
relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his 
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privy,•• Parkl·ane· Ho:siery Company, 'Inc. v, Sho·re, 439 U.S. 322, 
326 (19791. The rule should bar the claim asserted herein. 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusion reached by the trial court is a novel 
approach to unilateral contracts in the real estate industry, 
never adopted by this or any other jurisdiction. Under the 
trial court's holding once a broker communicates an "idea" 
that is "significant" to an eventual sale transaction, the 
listing broker may not modify his unilateral of fer of sub-
agency. The listing broker may not do so, even if the broker 
having the "idea" represents no one, produces no purchaser and 
does not even perform services which are "substantial" as re-
quired by the minority rule. 
Unless this Court is prepared to abandon its well 
settled requirement of producing a "ready, willing and able 
buyer" on the "terms of the offer" for the innovative rule 
adopted by the.trial court, this case must be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this j?d, 
September, 1982. 
PARKER M. NIELSON 
MARY LOU GODBE 
day of 
~,. /~ ~ By :'<·:'.,._ -,;~ , ,,. , · ~o 
"'"Attorneys for Appel ant 
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